The initial thoughts of declinism among Chinese leaders provide an alternative explanation for China’s assertiveness. While optimists can simply wait for a better future, pessimists need to exploit the image of the rising China to their advantage. The prospect of decline creates an incentive for Chinese leaders to grab what they can while they can. Overconfidence certainly is dangerous in international relations, but a pessimistic Chinese leadership can be more threatening than an optimistic one.
In the short-term, domestic context, Chinese political leaders face a public opinion and the military that have developed their own image of China’s century. Although the Chinese economy has shown remarkable high-speed growth for more than three decades, it will eventually fail to keep up with expectations of the public and the military.
With respect to foreign relations, the perception of declining American power will serve to further frustrate the Chinese public if their national government fails to stand up to the US. Even if Chinese power continues to build, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party may find the growth not fast enough for maintaining their political legitimacy. Consequently, the assertiveness of declinist leaders may be amplified by domestic politics.
It is not advantageous to admit that your nation’s power will decline, and so signs of declinism among Chinese leaders may be hard to detect. But the Chinese Communist Party has many reasons to worry about the future. China has been benefiting from its demographic structure, with a large working-age population and relatively small number of young and elderly dependents. China’s labor force, however, has already begun to shrink, a process that will accelerate from around 2020, leaving a large number of retirees.
The Chinese economy must also overcome the middle income trap, inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, corruption and environmental problems.
With all challenges the Chinese leaders will face, declinism in Beijing may palpably impact upon domestic and foreign policy sooner than present optimism dares to hint.
This article first appeared at The Conversation.
Tongfi Kim is a research fellow at Griffith Asia Institute & Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University.
